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2K: Covid19
It is a strange feeling when something you have been 
researching for almost a decade suddenly becomes a part of 
the public conversation. That happened to the two of us when 
discussions of COVID-19 started intersecting with mobile 
phone location data. We have studied mobile phone location 
data since we were doctoral students, and we have argued 
that institutions should be more transparent about how much 
location data they collect (Evans & Saker, 2017; Frith, 2015). 
Somewhat surprisingly, it took a global pandemic to drive 
home that point.
Within a few weeks of the virus’ spread in the United 
States, discussions of location data were everywhere; visual-
izations of mobility practices became a recurring feature of 
media outlets, and governments began discussing the use of 
location data to track the mobility of infected people. This 
essay argues location data’s 15 minutes of public fame is a 
potential opportunity to raise attention about locational pri-
vacy issues that were present long before COVID-19. 
Namely, we look at three major locational data issues impli-
cated by the current pandemic: (1) anonymized data some-
times are not anonymous, (2) locational data are often not 
representative and can exacerbate inequality, and (3) location 
data are a key part of the extension of the surveillance state. 
We conclude by asking whether this moment of visibility for 
location data collection could provide an opportunity to push 
for new media literacies.
Mobile phones have transmitted location data since the 
advent of cell towers (Ling & Donner, 2008). However, the 
accuracy and the number of actors who collect location data 
have shifted. Actors—ranging from telecoms to Google and 
Apple to individual app developers and whoever they sell 
data to—collect location data produced through mobile 
phones, and people have little recourse to understand how 
their data are being used and who has access to them (Frith, 
2015). Take as an example the recent visualizations of cell 
phone location data used to show everything from the travel 
patterns of spring breakers to the distance people traveled in 
mid-March after stay-at-home orders were given; however, 
people were left guessing where the data came from. 
Regarding the spring break visualization, for example, CNN 
was unable to track down the origin of these data (Barrett, 
2020). A series of New York Times visualizations that tracked 
movement in relation to stay-at-home orders reported they 
received their data from an intelligence firm called Cuebiq 
(Glanz et al., 2020), which raises questions about where 
Cuebiq got these data, and so on.
Data visualizations are just one example of the increase in 
attention given to location data during the pandemic. A more 
prominent example is government (and sometimes corpo-
rate) digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing involves 
identifying infected individuals and then tracing the people 
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they have been in contact with. For the most part, this pro-
cess uses Bluetooth technology that logs when devices are in 
close proximity to another device associated with an infected 
user for a prolonged period of time. Contact tracing applica-
tions feature different design choices and sources of data, 
and these choices—for example, whether the data storage is 
decentralized or whether the Bluetooth data are combined 
with GPS—raise different levels of privacy concerns (Bell, 
2020). Specific systems aside, digital contact tracing raises 
important questions about issues such as locational privacy 
and digital inequality that should be addressed, especially 
because some experts think these apps will neither be par-
ticularly effective nor sufficiently adopted to render them 
useful (Alkhatib, 2020; Bell, 2020).
The locative functions of smartphones have been a major 
focus of the field of Mobile Communication Studies (MCS) 
for more than a decade (Campbell, 2018), and much of that 
research has focused on privacy issues (de Souza e Silva & 
Frith, 2010). While COVID-19 does not raise wholly novel 
locational privacy issues, it does increase the public visibil-
ity of issues associated with locational data. By no means is 
the list below comprehensive, but we tackle three of those 
issues and conclude by speculating about whether the pan-
demic could be an opportunity to raise awareness of the 
extent and consequences of the location data our smart-
phones transmit.
Issue 1: Anonymized Data Are Often 
Not Anonymous
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an explosion of popular 
science communication, such as the data visualizations 
detailed above. These visualizations use anonymized mobile 
phone data to visualize people’s mobility. The spring break 
visualization, for example, put anonymized dots on a map 
and visualized how they spread across the United States as 
they left Florida. The data are scrubbed of individual identi-
fiers, which supposedly make it acceptable from a privacy 
standpoint. However, these visualizations and the broader 
use of anonymized data raise serious issues about how effec-
tive anonymization is.
In the mid-2000s, America Online released a huge amount 
of anonymized search data to the public. Through only a 
handful of search queries, researchers were able to deanony-
mize some of the data and track it back to individual users 
(Barbaro & Zeller, 2006). And the same has been shown with 
location data: one study took an anonymized location dataset 
and found that “four spatio-temporal points are enough to 
uniquely identify 95% of the individuals” (de Montjoye 
et al., 2013, p. 1). Consequently, the anonymized data visual-
izations used to visualize mobility in relation to the pandemic 
could raise similar issues and work as a conversation starter 
about how identifiable apparently “anonymous” location 
data actually are.
Issue 2: Location Data Are Not Always 
Representative and Can Exacerbate 
Inequality
One of the problems with the occasionally blind faith in big 
data has been ignorance of just what data are collected and 
who it leaves out (boyd & Crawford, 2012). That has always 
been true for location data as well. Back in the early 2010s, 
the LiveHoods project produced maps of Foursquare check-
ins, and some outlets used these maps to show the “popular” 
areas of the cities. However, the maps were markedly devoid 
of check-ins in large parts of the city. Were those areas 
empty? No. Instead, they were often minority areas of the 
city where people did not use Foursquare (Frith, 2017). As 
locative media research has shown, context and marginaliza-
tion matters with location data (Graham & Zook, 2013).
Digital contact tracing will likely exacerbate the inequal-
ity already present in locational data analyses. Most of these 
apps work by using Bluetooth to record the proximity 
between handsets so people can be alerted if someone gets 
sick. Obviously, people can only be alerted if they own a 
smartphone. Consequently, children, the homeless, some 
elderly, non-adopters, and people without financial means 
will be left out of the analysis (Alkhatib, 2020). Even many 
people who do own smartphones will not be able to partici-
pate because their devices do not have the proper low-energy 
Bluetooth capabilities. Even if these people wanted to par-
ticipate in digital contact tracing, they will not be able to and 
will instead be rendered invisible in the analysis, with conse-
quences possibly far more serious than the neighborhoods 
left out of Foursquare maps.
Issue 3: Location Data Are a Key Part 
of the Extension of the Surveillance 
State
Some of the very early writing about locative media—mostly 
from artists—discussed its surveillance potential (Tuters & 
Varnellis, 2006). Knowing where a device is or what it is 
close to raises obvious surveillance concerns. And much of 
the locative media literature has tracked how surveillance 
has become more extensive as smartphones have become 
more widely adopted. After all, locational metadata played a 
role in Edward Snowden’s revelations, and the ability to 
track location is a major piece of the larger surveillance state 
(Frith, 2015).
As many activists have warned, the embrace of digital 
contact tracing could involve strengthening the surveillance 
state in unprecedented ways, which is why privacy protec-
tions are so important (Bell, 2020). And the history of sur-
veillance suggests it can be difficult to roll back surveillance 
technologies once they have been enacted (Lyon, 2010). 
Much of the surveillance state built after 9/11 remains in 
effect almost two decades after the attack. Maybe the 
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location data collection authorized through contact tracing 
would be removed once the pandemic passed. Just as likely, 
however, is that these systems remain in place to deal with 
the “next” outbreak, a possibility some privacy advocates 
fear (Alkhatib, 2020). And the longer these systems remain 
in place, the more entrenched they inevitably become, and 
the more uses they will likely accrue.
The Pandemic and Media Literacies
Looking for any silver linings amid a global pandemic seems 
almost crass, but the rise of popular data visualizations and 
digital contact tracing could be an opportunity to increase 
people’s knowledge about the extent of data smartphones 
share about their lives. We recognize that improved media 
literacies around these issues are only one small part of a 
larger puzzle. As media scholars have argued, many issues 
that can supposedly be solved by improved media literacies 
need to be addressed at the level of policy to be effective 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2018). That is certainly true of digital con-
tact tracing as well. The policy and architectural levels are 
where decisions about what to collect, where to store the 
data, and how the data can be used will be made. However, 
an expanded knowledge of how smartphones work and ques-
tions about where data come from can help people make 
decisions when choosing how to engage with these apps and 
their smartphones more generally. They can also become 
pedagogical tools within media classrooms. Students can 
track down where popular mobile phone visualizations got 
their data (and often end up at dead ends). They can learn 
about the deanonymization of datasets and the broader access 
and marginalization issues present in projects like digital 
contact tracing.
While these literacies will not solve the questions sur-
rounding digital contact tracing, they can help people engage 
differently with personal decisions about whether to use 
these apps and to ask questions about how they work. 
Smartphones constantly transmit location data, which can 
then make its way into various datasets without their knowl-
edge. Those datasets might be anonymized, but that is often 
not as foolproof as the word makes it sound. Contact tracing 
apps create logs of who people are near, which has major 
surveillance potential that might never disappear once the 
apps are created. And on top of those concerns, locative data-
sets leave out certain users and can essentially render people 
invisible if they are not using the right technologies.
At this point, it is debatable how successful contact trac-
ing will even be in combating the virus. But what is not 
debatable is that they, along with various COVID-19 visual-
izations, raise important questions that have long been pres-
ent in the locative media literature. We hope that by raising 
these issues now, the increased attention paid to locative data 
could be an opportunity to improve media literacies in the 
future. In particular, these visualizations and contact tracing 
apps could be valuable pedagogical tools to get students and 
members of the general public to think more deeply about 
just how revealing, or not, a picture their smartphones paint 
of their everyday lives.
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